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Geoffrey J. Butler
Supreme Court Clerk
332 State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick, et al.
Case No. 890205

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Gold Standard, Inc., the plaintiff/appellant in the abovereferenced matter, submits this letter as a supplement to its
memoranda and argument in support of its appeal. Since the
January 8, 1990 oral argument, Gold Standard has discovered
pertinent and significant authority bearing on an issue presented
in the appeal. Accordingly, Gold Standard has enclosed ten
copies of this submission and the authority.
Specifically, Gold Standard would like to bring to the
court's attention the case of In re Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), and the cases cited therein, in support of Gold
Standard's fourth argument as stated in the "Brief of Appellant,
Gold Standard, Inc." at 47-49. That argument concerns whether
information obtained outside of the formal discovery process can
be regulated by a protective order, based upon allegations that
the information is work product, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gold Standard appreciates the opportunity to place before
the court this newly-acquired authority, and respectfully
requests that the Court consider In re Rafferty when ruling upon

Geoffrey J. Putler
j,:
February
^U
Page 2

Gold Standard's fourth argument at staIt'll
reiterated during oral argument,
Again, thank you very v\-n \ for V O L .
matter.
Very truly yours

/ J? uames S . Lowr i e
JSL/sk
cc:
Gordon T-. Roberts, Esq.
Stephc, Crockett, Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _±/_

day of February,

1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the aforementioned supplemental authority filed this day
with the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, to the following parties
of record:
Gordon L. Roberts
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Stephen G. Crockett
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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(1 (D.C.CIr. 1988)

Former employee petitioned for writ of
mandamus, challenging the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,
Harold H. Greene, J., affirmance of magistrate's decision to place under protective
order certain information obtained by former employee before he began litigation
against his former employer. The Court of
Appeals, Mikva, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) district court's decision was reviewable
under collateral order exception to final
judgment rule, and (2) magistrate exceeded
scope of his delegated powers by placing
under protective order materials not obtained through discovery.
Vacated and remanded.
1. United States Magistrates <s=>31
District court's decision, affirming
magistrate's protective order prohibiting
transfer to third parties of computer disks
of information obtained by party prior to
litigation, was reviewable under collateral
order exception to final judgment. 28 U.S.
C.A. § 1291.
2. United States Magistrates e=>17
Magistrate exceeded his delegated
powers by placing under protective order
floppy disks of information obtained by
former employee prior to litigation against
his former employer; magistrate's powers
w
ere limited to supervising discovery process, and materials in question were not
obtained through discovery.
On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to
the United States District Court for the
district of Columbia (Civil Action No. 871521).
Scott J. Rafferty, pro se.

Before MIKVA and SILBERMAN,
Circuit Judges, and PARKER, Senior
District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
MIKVA, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner challenges a district court ruling that placed under a protective order
certain information in petitioner's possession that petitioner had obtained before
litigation and discovery began. The district court order prevented petitioner from
disclosing the information to third persons,
including the Department of Justice. We
find the district court's decision appealable
as a collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528
(1949), and we vacate the order.
I. BACKGROUND

On May 6, 1986, petitioner Scott J. Rafferty was hired by Telco Research Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of NYNEX
Corporation. NYNEX is one of the Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs") created by
the break-up of the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company ("AT & T"). Mr. Rafferty was a senior vice president in charge
of Telco's consulting division. The AT & T
consent decree prevented BOCs from engaging in any business other than local
phone service without first obtaining a
waiver from Judge Harold H. Greene. See
United States v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, 226-34
(D.D.C.1982), affd, 460 U.S. 1001, 103 S.Ct.
1240, 75 L.Ed.2d 472 (1983). Since Mr.
Rafferty was unsure whether NYNEX had
the authority to operate a consulting business, he requested a legal opinion from
NYNEX's attorneys; two weeks later, on
November 10, 1986, NYNEX fired him.
NYNEX asserts that it also terminated the
consulting business at this time.
The episode sparked an investigation of
NYNEX by the Department of Justice,
with which Mr. Rafferty cooperated. Mr.
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Rafferty also filed an action against
NYNEX alleging misrepresentation, breach
of contract, unlawful discharge, and antitrust violations. The case was assigned to
Judge Greene because Mr. Rafferty and his
counsel designated the case as "related" to
AT & T. The district court originally directed that discovery in the lawsuit terminate in November 1987, but that date was
later extended at Mr. Rafferty's request
until January 1, 1988.
On January 29, 1988, NYNEX and Telco
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the entire action. Mr. Rafferty's own opposition to this motion included an affidavit in which he asserted
that he had received four floppy disks of
information "hacked" from Telco's computers indicating that NYNEX possessed documents that were responsive to his discovery requests but that had not been produced. This, Mr. Rafferty maintained, was
yet another reason to deny NYNEX's motion. The disks also allegedly contain information revealing violations by NYNEX
of the antitrust consent decree. On March
1, NYNEX filed what it styled an "Emergency Motion for Hearing and Return of
Property," seeking the return of the floppy
disks and all information obtained from
them. Six days later, the magistrate supervising discovery, Patrick J. Attridge,
granted this motion, ordering Mr. Rafferty
to turn over the disks to NYNEX. At this
point Mr. Rafferty had not had a chance to
respond to NYNEX's motion. The magistrate then scheduled a hearing on the matter. Meanwhile, Mr. Rafferty complied
with the order.
At the hearing, the parties disputed
whether Mr. Rafferty had obtained the
floppy disks legally. Mr. Rafferty maintained that the day after he was dismissed
from Telco, he requested copies of his electronic mail messages from a Telco manager, who made the floppy disk copies for
him. As it turned out, the information
transferred to the four floppy disks included some messages that were not Mr. Rafferty's. NYNEX asserted that Mr. Rafferty had gained possession of the disks in an
unauthorized fashion by persuading a Telco
computer room employee named Hollis to

make the copies for him. Both parties
agreed, however, that Mr. Rafferty obtained the disks the day after his employment was terminated. Mr. Rafferty also
disclosed during the course of the hearing
that some of the material on the floppy
disks was contained in the memory of his
personal computer, which he had purchased
from Telco at the time of his departure.
The magistrate declined to resolve Mr.
Rafferty's right to possess either the disks
or the information within his personal computer. In an order dated March 11, 1988,
however, the magistrate sought to resolve
the use of the disks and memory information during the litigation. The order permitted NYNEX to retain the originals of
the floppy disks but required the return of
copies of the disks to Mr. Rafferty. The
magistrate then placed, for the duration of
the litigation, all information contained on
the disks, and all information relating to
NYNEX and Telco in the personal computer memory, under the protective order to
which the parties had already agreed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). After Mr. Rafferty's case against NYNEX and Telco was
completed, the magistrate ruled, Mr. Rafferty could apply to Judge Greene for a
determination whether the disks and computer memory data could be released. This
meant that in the interim Mr. Rafferty
could use the information only in connection with the pending litigation; he could
not disclose it to third parties such as the
Department of Justice.
In a memorandum opinion dated March
31, 1988, and filed April 5, 1988, Judge
Greene affirmed the magistrate's order and
denied Mr. Rafferty's motion for reconsideration. Judge Greene found:
This Order was entered after a hearing
at which plaintiff was present and allowed to state his position. Because the
items under discussion related to discovery in this case, consideration of this
issue was well within the Magistrate's
delegated jurisdiction. This Court will
not, without good cause, overturn a decision taken after proper evaluation of the
parties' respective positions. No such

Cite as 864 F.2d 151 (DC. Ctr. 1988)

reason appears here. Therefore, [Mr.
Rafferty's] motion will be denied.
Memorandum
opinion at 4.
Judge
Greene's March 31 ruling also denied a
motion by Mr. Rafferty's counsel to withdraw and a related motion by Mr. Rafferty
to appear pro se. Later, however, in a
memorandum and order dated October 24,
1988 and filed October 25, 1988, Judge
Greene granted the motion of counsel to
withdraw and permitted the appearance of
Mr. Rafferty pro se.
Also on March 31, 1988, Mr. Rafferty
filed a motion to enforce the AT & T antitrust decree, based on language in an order
entered in United States v. Western Electric Co., 578 F.Supp. 677, 679 (D.D.C.1983),
providing that "[a]n interested third party,
whether or not it has heretofore been
granted intervenor status • * * may apply
to the Court for appropriate action" after
serving a request for enforcement upon the
Department of Justice. The motion was
returned to Mr. Rafferty by the Clerk of
the district court. On April 29, 1988, Judge
Greene notified this court that Mr. Rafferty's motion had been rejected because of a
clerical error and that the district court had
granted leave to Mr. Rafferty to file his
motion.
On April 22, 1988, Mr. Rafferty filed a
petition for mandamus with this court,
seeking a writ that would direct Judge
Greene to: (1) grant the motion of Mr.
Rafferty's attorney to withdraw; (2) permit
Mr. Rafferty to appear pro se; (3) vacate
the magistrate's order of March 11, 1988,
which placed the floppy disks and information contained in the personal computer
memory under the protective order; (4)
grant a hearing to determine whether the
case should be transferred to another
judge in the district court; and (5) accept
for filing the motion to enforce the AT & T
consent decree.
II.

DISCUSSION

We treat the first, second, and fifth requests as moot because the requested re"€f has already been granted by the dis^ c t court. See County of Los Angeles v.
Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379,
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1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); Friends of
Keeseville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230,
232-33 (D.C.Cir.1988). Because the matter
remains before the district court, any concerns Mr. Rafferty has regarding the continued effect of discovery agreements entered into by his counsel are appropriately
raised in the district court rather than here.
We also find it unnecessary to consider Mr.
Rafferty's motion to transfer. Because the
district court has permitted Mr. Rafferty to
appear pro se, he can now properly submit
a motion to transfer to the district court.
At this time, there is no indication in the
record that Judge Greene has conducted
this case in such a way as would warrant
the remedy or transfer. With respect to
the third requested form of relief, we vacate the magistrate's orders of March 7
and March 11, 1988, as well as that portion
of Judge Greenes memorandum opinion of
March 31 that affirmed them.

[1] We pause at the outset to note that
the decision placing the disks and information under the protective order, and thereby prohibiting Mr. Rafferty from transferring them to third parties, is reviewable
under the collateral order exception to the
final judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. As the Supreme Court found in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan
Corp., 337 U . S . 5 4 1 , 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221,
1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949):
This decision appears to fall in that small
class which finally determine claims of
right separate from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated. The Court
has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical
construction.
Sec also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 429-32, 105 S.Ct. 2757,
2760-62, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985); Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265, 104
S.Ct. 1051, 1054-55, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984).
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The district court's decision meets this
test. First, it "conclusively determine^]
the disputed question," Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct.
2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). As a
result of the order in question, Mr. Rafferty cannot disclose the information to third
persons during the potentially quite
lengthy litigation with NYNEX, and he can
disclose it thereafter only after first applying to the district court. Second, it is "an
important question completely separate
from the merits of the action," 437 U.S. at
468, 98 S.Ct. at 2458. See also Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806,
2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (noting that
collateral order must be "conceptually distinct" from the merits of the litigation).
The order reviewed today is entirely independent of the underlying wrongful discharge claim. Whether Mr. Rafferty can
disclose the information depends on how he
obtained it, what its contents are, and what
his legal rights of disclosure are. These
questions are not intertwined in the slightest with Mr. Rafferty's complaint that he
was terminated as a "whistleblower" for
exposing NYNEX's possible antitrust violations. Cf Green v. Department of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 840 (D.C.Cir.1980);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d
1108, 1117 (3d Cir.1986), cert, denied, —
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed.2d 485
(1987).
Finally, Mr. Rafferty's claim today would
"be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2458.
The disclosure issue is so far removed from
the merits of the underlying case that it is
difficult to imagine how Mr. Rafferty could
even raise the issue on appeal. Even if he
could, the public interest in the prompt
disclosure of information, as illustrated by
the prior restraint doctrine of first amendment law, means that a slow, tortuous appeal, filed after a long, time-consuming trial, is not an effective remedy in this case.
See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d
584 (1963) (noting that a prior restraint is
invalid unless it "assure[s] an almost imme-
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diate judicial determination of the validity
of the restraint") (footnote omitted).
Although discovery orders, being interlocutory, are not normally appealable,
pragmatic concerns have led us in the past
to find similar lower court orders appealable, see, e.g., Tavoulareas i\ Washington
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C.Cir.)
(permitting appeal challenging district
court order that partially removed protective order), vacated on other grounds, 737
F.2d 1170 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc). Our
sister circuits have also noted that discovery orders meeting the Cohen criteria
are appealable as collateral orders. See,
e.g., Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students
v.
Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 711-12 (5th
Cir.1979) (permitting, under Cohen, appeal
of discovery order requiring disclosure of
identities of anonymous lawyers and members of association who alleged that law
firm hiring practices were discriminatory
and who feared retaliation if their names
were released).
The case before us is an even more compelling one, because what is really under
challenge today is not a discovery order at
all, but rather an order preventing the disclosure of materials obtained outside the
discovery process. Mr. Rafferty, like the
newspaper that seeks access to sealed documents in a judicial proceeding, wishes to
disseminate information under a protective
order to the public. Although there are
concededly great differences between that
case and this one, the separability of the
issue of disclosure from the underlying
merits of the litigation and the ineffectiveness of appeal as a remedy are the same in
both cases. It would certainly be anomalous if a litigant in Mr. Rafferty's shoes
who wished to distribute information to the
government or to the media could not appeal an order forbidding him from doing so,
while the newspaper to whom he wished to
give his story were able to appeal. See In
re Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1330 (D.C.Cir.
1985) (permitting appeal, under Cohen, by
the press of an order that sealed documents in a civil trial following a pretrial
protective order).

We therefore find that the district
court's decision affirming the magistrate's
orders is appealable.
B.
f2] Having found that the district
court's decision is appealable, we reach the
substance of Mr. Rafferty's claim. It is
clear to us that the magistrate exceeded his
jurisdiction by issuing the orders in this
case and that the district court erred in
affirming
them.
See
28
U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) (magistrate's order may be
reconsidered if "clearly erroneous or contrary to law"). By all accounts, Mr. Rafferty possessed the items in question before litigation began; he did not obtain
them through a discovery request.

obtained before the litigation began, to any
person other than the parties to this case
and their counsel. The March 7 order also
required Mr. Rafferty to return the disks
to NYNEX. The magistrate thereby exceeded his delegated powers, which were
limited to supervising the discovery process. The district court erred when it
found that "the items under discussion related to discovery in this case." They did
not.

NYNEX and Telco argue that Mr. Rafferty must be prevented from disclosing
the information in question to third parties
because he obtained it improperly. Mr.
Rafferty contends that by using the word
"hacked," he did not mean to imply that
the disks were stolen, or that he was anyIn Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 thing but an innocent recipient of them.
U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 We find it unnecessary to resolve this fac(1984), the Supreme Court held that a pro- tual dispute, or to reach the question
tective order entered after a showing of whether Mr. Rafferty would be entitled to
good cause did not offend the first amend- distribute the information even if he had
Cf.
ment, because the party "gained the infor- obtained it without authorization.
mation [it] wish[ed] to disseminate only by Landmark Communications v. Virginia,
virtue of the trial court's discovery pro- 435 U.S. 829, 843-44, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1543cesses." 467 U.S. at 32, 104 S.Ct. at 2207. 44, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Rodgers v. United
The Court emphasized that a "party may States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 n.
disseminate the identical information cover- 16 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing New York Times
ed by the protective order as long as the Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct.
information is gained through means inde- 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)); L. Tribe,
pendent of the court's processes," 467 U.S. American Constitutional Law § 12-21, at
at 34, 104 S.Ct. at 2208, and upheld the 966 n. 6 (2d ed. 1988). NYNEX and Telco
order at issue in that case in part because are free to seek any legal or equitable
it did "not restrict the dissemination of the relief available to them to remedy the alleginformation if gained from other sources." edly improper obtaining and usage of the
467 U.S. at 37, 104 S.Ct. at 2209. See also disks and information in the computer
The Courier-Journal
v. Marshall, 828 memory and to prevent Mr. Rafferty from
F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir.1987) (upholding pro- disseminating them. What NYNEX and
tective order that "limit[ed] access only to Telco may not do, however, is use the hapspecified fruits of discovery");
Anderson penstance of a discovery proceeding to
r. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 14 (1st Cir. place under a protective order materials
1986) (holding that a protective order must not obtained through discovery. We intinot "restrict the dissemination of informa- mate no views on the questions of disk
ownership and Mr. Rafferty's right to distion obtained from other sources").
tribute the disks and information; we hold
We do not question the power of the
only that on the facts before us, the protecdistrict court to regulate discovery or the
tive order was not a proper remedy.
manner in which materials may be used in
a
litigation pending before it. But the
III.
CONCLUSION
magistrate's orders had the effect of preventing petitioner from disclosing the inforThe magistrate's orders of March 7 and
mation in question, which petitioner had
11, 1988, are vacated, as is that portion of
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the district court's memorandum opinion of
March 31 affirming them. The case is
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

MID-TEX ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, et al.
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION.
No. 87-1675.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit
Argued Oct. 7, 1988.

1. Electricity <s=»11.3(6)
Orders of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission must include reasoned opinion
detailing those factual elements in record
that underlie Commission's actions.
2. Electricity <s=>l 1.3(1)
In connection with adoption of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission rule permitting electric utilities to include portion
of costs of construction work in progress in
rate bases, Commission adequately addressed concerns of wholesale customers
who sought to construct facilities to meet
all or part of their future needs by permitting submission of forward looking allocation ratios that would reduce or eliminate
such payments by wholesale customers
with plans to build their own generation
facilities and subjecting wholesale customers who did not thereafter terminate or
reduce service to sanctions for amount of
underestimation. Federal Power Act, § § 1
et seq., 313(b), 321, as amended, 16 U.S.
C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a, 825/ (b).

Decided Dec. 9, 1988.
Wholesale customers of suppliers of
electric power filed petition to review aspects of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rule permitting utilities to include
portion of costs of construction work in
progress in their rate bases. The Court of
Appeals, Stephen F. Williams, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) rule adequately addressed problem faced by wholesale customer who decided to construct facilities to
meet all or part of its future needs by
permitting customer to submit forward
looking allocation ratios that would reduce
or eliminate payments for cost of construction work in progress by wholesale customer; (2) Commission's decision to address
regulatory "price squeeze" created by disparity in treatment of costs of construction
work in progress by state regulatory agencies and Commission was reasonable; and
(3) burden of proof required of wholesale
customer seeking preliminary relief from
anticompetive "price squeeze" was not
based on reasoned decision making.
Review granted.

3. Electricity <©=>11.3(1)
In connection with adoption of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission rule permitting electric utilities to include portion
of their costs of construction work in
progress in their rate bases, Commission's
decision to proceed on case-by-case basis
with respect to anticompetitive "price
squeeze" imposed on wholesale customers
of utilities which was created by disparity
in treatment of costs of construction work
in progress by state regulatory agencies
and Commission was reasonable, given lack
of uniformity in approaches taken by various states to inclusion of costs of construction work in progress in rate base. Federal
Power Act, §§ 1 et seq., 313(b), 321, as
amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a,
825/(b).
4. Electricity «s=>11.3(6)
In connection with adoption of Federal
Regulatory Commission rule permitting
electric utilities to include portion of their
costs of construction work in progress in
rate bases, burden of proof required of
wholesale customer seeking preliminary re-
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lief from anticompetitive "price squeeze"
which was created by disparity in treatment of costs of construction work in
progress by state regulatory agencies and
Commission was not product of reasoned
decision making, as Commission ignored
fact that it could order suspension of rate
increase related only to cost of construction
work in progress, which did not involve
permanent loss of rate increase for period
of suspension, but only deferral; rule required wholesale customers to show concrete, substantial likelihood of suffering
imminent irreparable harm. Federal Power Act, §§ 1 et seq., 313(b), 321, as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a, 825/
(b).

Petition for Review of an Order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Robert A. O'Neil, with whom, Wallace F.
Tillman and Michael D. Oldak, Washington,
D.C., were on the brief for petitioners.
Samuel Sopper, Atty., F.E.R.C., with
whom Catherine A. Cook, Gen. Counsel,
and Jerome M. Feit, Sol., F.E.R.C., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for respondent. Joshua Z. Rokach, Atty., F.E.R.C.,
Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for respondent.
Alan J. Statman, Washington, D.C., was
on the brief, for intervenor Southwestern
Public Service Co.
Albert R. Simonds, Jr., Washington,
D.C., was on the brief, for intervenor Montaup Elec. Co.
Before EDWARDS, WILLIAMS and
D.H. GINSBURG *, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by
Circuit Judge STEPHEN F.
WILLIAMS.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit
Judge:
This is the third of a series of cases
tefore this court dealing with the Federal
Circuit Judge D.H. Ginsburg was a member of
lh
e panel but did not participate in this deci-
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Energy Regulatory Commission's proposals to adjust the timing of federally regulated electric utilities' recovery of the cost
of capital employed in construction. Before the adoption of the contested rules, a
utility normally could recover these costs
only after a newly constructed facility became operational. It would accrue the
carrying charges on the capital used to
finance new construction in a separate account, "Allowance for Funds Used During
Construction" ("AFUDC"), which appeared
as a non-cash asset on the utility's balance
sheet. When the plant went into service,
the entire value of the investment, including these accrued financing charges, would
be added to the rate base. Only at this
point would the utility begin to recover its
financing costs from ratepayers.
FERC's current proposal would allow a
utility to include up to 50 percent of the
costs of ''construction work in progress,"
or "CWIP," in its rate base as it incurred
them and thus to start earning a return
that typically would offset 50 percent of
the associated costs of debt and equity
capital. The utility in principle recovers all
its costs under either the AFUDC or CWIP
method, but CWIP allows a substantial
part to be recovered sooner.
A group of wholesale customers of suppliers of electric power have attacked this
rule on a variety of grounds, focusing primarily on alleged anticompetitive effects.
Although we find that the Commission has
not been arbitrary or capricious in its assessment of the potential anticompetitive
problems and adoption of solutions, we
grant the petition for review because
FERC has not supported one aspect of the
rule with reasoned decisionmaking. We remand the case to the agency for further
consideration of the burden of proof required of a party seeking preliminary relief
from an anticompetitive "price squeeze."
FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission, opened the door to CWIP in
1976 with an order allowing its use under
sion.

